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I. INTRODUCTION
When Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox attempted to
investigate allegations of misconduct by officials in the Nixon admin-
istration, President Richard Nixon ordered him fired.' Although
Leon Jaworski replaced Cox as Watergate Special Prosecutor,2 the
President's dismissal of Cox patently demonstrated that the executive
branch could not carry out an impartial investigation of its own mem-
1. Kneeland, Bork Takes Over, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1973, § 1, at 1, col. 8. Attorney
General Elliot Richardson appointed Cox pursuant to a Department of Justice regulation that
created the Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force. See 38 Fed. Reg. 14,688 (June 4,
1973). Under the regulation, Cox could be removed only for "extraordinary improprieties."
Id. President Nixon ordered Cox' dismissal when Cox insisted that the President turn over
numerous tape recordings of White House conversations. Finding that Cox had committed no
"extraordinary improprieties" to justify his removal, a United States district court
subsequently held that President Nixon's discharge of Archibald Cox violated the Department
of Justice regulation creating the office. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973).
2. Herbers, Nixon Names Saxbe Attorney General; Jaworski Appointed Special Prosecutor,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 5. Acting Attorney General, Robert H. Bork, appointed
Jaworski pursuant to a regulation similar to the one under which Cox was appointed. See 38
Fed. Reg. 30,738 (Nov. 7, 1973).
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bers. In response to this fundamental conflict of interest, Congress
enacted the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. 3 The Ethics Act pro-
vides for the appointment of independent counsels to investigate and
prosecute certain high level executive officers suspected of criminal
violations.4 To ensure that these independent counsels may act with-
out bias, the Act vests significant authority over their appointment,
supervision, and removal in the judicial rather than in the executive
branch of the federal government.
The notion of removing a prosecutor from the supervision of the
executive branch has been the subject of controversy since Water-
gate.' This controversy stems from concern that the independent
counsels' close relationship with the judicial branch may contravene
the separation of powers doctrine.6 In 1987, this controversy contin-
3. Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 601-602, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-74 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-598 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) [hereinafter Ethics Act].
In an effort to renew the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act, with
amendments, for a period of five years, Congress recently passed the Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 591-599 (enacted Dec. 15, 1987)). Except for those provisions specifically mentioned in
section 6(b)(2) of the Reauthorization Act, the Reauthorization Act does not take effect for
any investigations that were pending on December 15, 1987, the date of enactment of the
Reauthorization Act. The constitutionality of the office of independent counsel is currently
being challenged before the Supreme Court of the United States by Theodore Olson, whose
investigation was pending when Congress passed the Reauthorization Act. Thus, any textual
reference in this Comment to the independent counsel legislation refers to the version of the
Ethics Act currently in effect for investigations that were pending on December 15, 1987.
The provisions of the Reauthorization Act, however, represent no major departure from
those of the Ethics Act, and are thus not likely to have a significant effect on the
constitutionality of the office of independent counsel.
4. Those officers subject to the Act include the President, Vice President, Director of
Central Intelligence, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the heads of the Cabinet
departments, and numerous subordinate executive officers. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1982). Other
individuals who are not officers in the government may nonetheless be subject to the Act. 28
U.S.C. § 591(b)(6)-(b)(8), (c) (1982). Such individuals include the chairman and treasurer of
the national campaign committee seeking the election or reelection of the incumbent President.
28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(8) (1982).
When Congress enacted the Ethics Act in 1978, Congress used the term "special
prosecutor." In 1983, Congress amended the Act to refer to the prosecutor as "independent
counsel." Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, § 2, 96 Stat.
2039, 2039 (1983). Members of Congress determined that the words "special prosecutor"
created undue negative publicity for a person under investigation, primarily because of the
Watergate stigma associated with the term. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18,
reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3554.
5. Compare Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United
States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (1973) (testimony of Robert H. Bork, Acting Attorney
General) (arguing that the special prosecutor legislation is unconstitutional) with Special
Prosecutor. Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 319 (1973) (testimony of Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law, University of Chicago)
(arguing that the special prosecutor legislation is constitutional).
6. See id.
1988] INDEPENDENT COUNSELS
ued as former National Security Council member Oliver North,7 for-
mer White House deputy chief of staff Michael Deaver,8 and former
Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olson9 brought suit in federal
court challenging the constitutionality of the Ethics Act on separation
of powers grounds. Opponents of the Ethics Act claim that the Act
vests the independent counsel with substantial authority to enforce
the law and prosecute offendersI 0-both traditionally executive func-
tions-and that the Act thus violates separation of powers principles
by conferring on the judiciary the power to appoint, remove, and
supervise officers exercising executive functions.I
In In re Sealed Case,12 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics Act are unconstitutional. 3 The D.C. Circuit's ruling, pending
an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, threatens the
7. In re Sealed Case, 666 F. Supp. 231 (D.D.C.) (upholding the authority of an
independent counsel under Attorney General's regulation), aff'd, 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 753 (1988).
The current challenges to the constitutionality of the Ethics Act are not likely to affect the
investigation of Oliver North by independent counsel Lawrence Walsh. Even if the Supreme
Court eventually declares the Act unconstitutional, Walsh's investigation would remain valid
because Walsh accepted a parallel appointment as independent counsel from the Department
of Justice. But see Crovitz, Independent Counsels: Quo Warranto?, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1988, at
38, col. 3.
8. Deaver v. Seymour, 656 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C.) (denying plaintiff's motion for a
preliminary injunction against an independent counsel under the Ethics Act), aff'd, 822 F.2d
66 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 99 (1987).
9. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (2-1 decision), rev'g, 665 F. Supp. 56
(D.D.C. 1987) (mem.),prob. juris. noted sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988).
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 594 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
North v. Walsh, 656 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1987) (Nos. 87-0457, 87-0626) [hereinafter North's
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment]; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
Application for a Preliminary Injunction, Deaver v. Seymour, 656 F. Supp. 900 (D.D.C. 1987)
(No. 87-0477) [hereinafter Deaver's Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction];
Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265). But see, e.g., Brief for Independent Counsel
Lawrence E. Walsh as Amicus Curiae, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos.
87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265); Brief of United States Senate as Amicus Curiae, In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265); Brief of the Speaker and
Bipartisan Leadership Group of the United States House of Representatives, In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265); Brief of Common Cause as
Amicus Curiae, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-
5265); Brief of American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264, 87-5265).
12. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (2-1 decision), rev'g, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987)
(mem.), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988).
13. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In re Sealed Case involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of independent counsels under the Ethics Act brought by
former Assistant Attorney General Theodore Olson. Olson is under investigation by
independent counsel Alexia Morrison.
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elimination of independent counsels and raises, once again, the spec-
ter of an executive branch responsible for policing itself.
This Comment examines the constitutionality of the independent
counsel legislation within the context of the separation of powers doc-
trine. Section II explores the genesis of the law as a product of Water-
gate. Section III examines the two principal issues arising from the
appointment provisions of the Ethics Act: First, whether the
independent counsel is an "inferior officer" under the appointments
clause of the Constitution;14 and second, if the independent counsel is
an "inferior officer," whether it is constitutional to vest the appoint-
ment of the independent counsel, an executive officer, in a court of
law. Section IV analyzes those provisions of the Ethics Act that con-
fer upon the judiciary the authority to remove the independent coun-
sel and define his prosecutorial jurisdiction. Finally, Section V
concludes that the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act
do not violate the doctrine of separation of powers, but are a constitu-
tionally valid response to the need for checks and balances in the
investigation and prosecution of high level executive officers.
II. THE LAW AND ITS ORIGINS
A. Legislative History: The Lessons of Watergate
Several factors prompted Congress to enact a statute creating an
independent counsel. Initially, members of Congress believed it
would be unrealistic and naive to expect the Attorney General's office
to vigorously and impartially investigate executive officers.'" Because
the President nominates the Attorney General and serves as his supe-
rior, the Attorney General's ability to impartially investigate key
members of the President's administration, including the President
himself, is suspect. 6 In many cases, the Attorney General has been
the President's long-time personal friend or colleague. 7 Thus, when
the Department of Justice must investigate executive officers, it is
faced with a potential conflict of interest on both a personal and pro-
fessional level. 8
Members of Congress felt that such a conflict should be
addressed similar to the way conflicts of interest are addressed by the
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15. S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4216, 4221 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 170].
16. Id. at 6.
17. Taylor, Meese Fits Attorneys General Mold: Close Ties to the Chief, L.A. Daily J., Jan.
31, 1984, at 4, col. 3 (Presidents of the United States have traditionally chosen personal,
business, or political associates to serve as Attorney General).
18. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 5-6.
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private bar.'9 When private attorneys are faced with a conflict of
interest, the American Bar Association, according to the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, suggests that attorneys recuse themselves.2"
Members of Congress reasoned that the government should strive, as
do private lawyers, to avoid even the appearance of bias. 2' For even
the perception of a conflict of interest may undermine the public's
confidence in the Department of Justice and damage the legitimacy of
the executive branch.22 Aside from avoiding these problems, mem-
bers of Congress believed that the objectivity of an independent coun-
sel could improve the thoroughness and efficacy of investigations,
while enhancing their deterrent effect on future violations.23
In attempting to eliminate this conflict of interest through the
enactment of the independent counsel legislation, Congress sought,
for constitutional reasons, to ensure a proper balance between the
autonomy of the independent counsel and the need to maintain some
relation between the independent counsel and the executive branch.24
Because, as a prosecutor, the independent counsel performs executive
functions,25 creating an absolute dichotomy between the independent
counsel and the executive branch would appear to violate separation
of powers principles.16 To overcome this constitutional hurdle, Con-
gress created an independent counsel who possesses considerable
autonomy, yet who retains some relation to the executive branch.27
B. A Statutory Overview
The Ethics Act gives the Attorney General the sole authority to
decide whether sufficient grounds exist for the appointment of an
independent counsel.28 Upon receiving information that an official
who is subject to the Act29 has violated a federal criminal law, other
than certain classes of misdemeanors, the Attorney General may con-
duct a preliminary investigation to assess whether an independent
19. Id. at 6.
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 comment (1983) ("A
lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently,
promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion.").
21. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 6-7.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 73.
25. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
26. See S. REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 73.
27. See id.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1982).
29. For a list of those individuals subject to the Act, see supra note 4.
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counsel should be appointed.3" If, after conducting the preliminary
investigation, the Attorney General "finds reasonable grounds to
believe that further investigation or prosecution is warranted,"'" he
must then apply for the appointment of an independent counsel.3 2 If
he determines that there is no need for further investigation, no
independent counsel can be appointed.33 In either case, the Attorney
General's decision is not subject to judicial review.34
After making a determination as to whether an independent
counsel should be appointed, the Attorney General's involvement in
the investigation and prosecution Of the particular individual is pri-
marily over.35 If the Attorney General finds that such an appoint-
30. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (Supp. III 1985). In determining whether to proceed with the
preliminary investigation, the Attorney General is to consider "the degree of specificity of the
information received, and ...the credibility of the source of the information." 28 U.S.C.
§ 592(a)(l)(A)-(a)(1)(B) (1982). In deciding whether to initiate this investigation, the
Attorney General is to filter out only groundless or frivolous allegations. S. REP. No. 170,
supra note 15, at 53-55. The Attorney General does not have his usual discretion to decide
that, although the claim may not be frivolous, the particular individual should not be
prosecuted for other reasons. He merely performs the administrative duty of rejecting baseless
claims. The Attorney General may also be asked to conduct a preliminary investigation upon
a majority vote of the minority or majority party members of the Committee on the Judiciary
of either House of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 595(e) (1982).
During the preliminary investigation phase, the Attorney General's powers are severely
restricted. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2) (1982) ("In conducting preliminary investigations ...the
Attorney General shall have no authority to convene grand juries, plea bargain, grant
immunity, or issue subpenas.").
31. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982). In this case as well, the Attorney General need only
decide whether the claim is frivolous, based on his preliminary investigation. S. REP. No. 170,
supra note 15, at 55.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1982). If the Attorney General decides that an independent
counsel should not be appointed, he must submit a "memorandum [to the special division of
the court] containing a summary of the information received and a summary of the results of
any preliminary investigation." 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(2) (1982). The fact that the special
division may make this report public provides a check against the Attorney General's
decisions. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3551. But cf 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(3) (1982) (Attorney General's report
cannot be made public without the approval of the special division).
34. The Ethics Act explicitly provides that decisions to appoint an independent counsel
are not subject to judicial review. 28 U.S.C. § 592(f) (1982). Judicial review of a decision by
the Attorney General not to seek appointment of an independent counsel appears to be
precluded by judicial decisions, although the Act does not directly address this question. See
Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167, 1169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1982); see
also Note, The Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Problems with the Attorney General's
Discretion and Proposals for Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 497, 507 (courts may not review an
Attorney General's decision under the Ethics Act); Comment, Banzhaf v. Smith: Judicial
Review Under the Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 1339, 1346-51 (1985) (criticizing the Banzhaf court for holding that an Attorney
General's decision is not reviewable).
35. Once the special division appoints an independent counsel, the Attorney General can
remove the independent counsel "only for good cause." 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982).
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ment is warranted, it then becomes the responsibility of a special
division of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit 36 to select a particular individual to serve as
independent counsel. 37  This special division also defines the
prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel and thus deter-
mines who may be subject to investigation. 8 The special division is
composed of three judges who are appointed to two-year terms by the
Chief Justice of the United States.39
An independent counsel is vested with extremely broad power in
the performance of his duties.' The Act provides that he is to exer-
cise "independent authority"41 so that members of the executive
branch will be unable to influence the way in which he fulfills his
responsibilities.42 He can "[review] all documentary evidence avail-
36. 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 593(a)-(b) (1982). The special division of the court must appoint an
independent counsel when so requested. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982). The independent counsel
who is appointed cannot be someone "who holds or recently held any office of profit or trust
under the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 593(d) (1982).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982). The special division may expand the jurisdiction of the
independent counsel during the course of an investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 594(e) (1982); S. REP.
No. 170, supra note 15, at 65.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 49(a), (d) (1982).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 594 (1982). Apparently, the only limitation on the independent
counsel's power is the authority retained by the Attorney General with regard to wiretaps. See
28 U.S.C. § 59 4(a) (1982) ("[Tlhe Attorney General shall exercise direction or control as to
those matters that specifically require the Attorney General's personal action under section
2516 of title 18 [Attorney General's authorization required for interception of wire, oral, or
electronic communication by Federal Bureau of Investigation or other federal agency]."); S.
REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 67.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1982).
42. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 66-67. The lack of executive supervision over the
independent counsel in the conduct of prosecutions may be problematic in the area of foreign
affairs. See North's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 11, at 38-42.
In the course of an investigation, an independent counsel may try to elicit information from a
foreign government. A prime example is Whitney North Seymour's attempt to obtain
information from the Canadian Government. Seymour, the independent counsel investigating
Michael Deaver, served a subpoena on Canada's Ambassador to the United States. A federal
court quashed the subpoena. United States v. Deaver, No. 87-096 (D.D.C. June 22, 1987).
Seymour then sent a letter to the Ambassador that was laced with implicit threats that a failure
to cooperate might have repercussions for Canada. Seymour v. North America, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 16, 1987, at 30, col. 1; Independent Counsel Is No Diplomat, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at
30, col. 3. The incident seriously angered the Canadian Government and it subsequently
demanded that the Department of State take action. Once again, the Department of Justice
had to seek relief in court. Seymour v. North America, supra, at 30, col. 1; Independent
Counsel Is No Diplomat, supra, at 30, col. 3.
Such incidents may recur. Because the law focuses on the conduct of the highest
executive officials, United States foreign policy may occasionally be implicated due to the
tendency of prominent executive officers to deal with matters of international import. Because
any communication between the United States Government and a foreign country can affect
United States foreign policy, an unsupervised independent counsel may undermine ongoing
1988]
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able from any source, ' 43 receive national security clearance, 4 pursue
indictments,4" and initiate prosecutions46 and appeals.47 Although the
independent counsel generally must comply with Department of Jus-
tice policies, he may deviate from such policies if compliance is "not
possible. "48
To preserve the autonomy of the independent counsel, the
authority of the executive branch to remove an independent counsel is
strictly limited.4 9 Of those officers in the executive branch, only the
Attorney General can remove an independent counsel,5 0 and "only
for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other
condition that substantially impairs the performance of such
independent counsel's duties." 51 The Attorney General's "for cause"
diplomatic objectives Seymour's attempt to gain information from the Canadian
Ambassador, for example, occurred at a delicate time in Canadian-American free trade
negotiations. See Seymour v. North America, supra, at 30, col. 1.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(4) (1982). To aid him in his task, the independent counsel can
appoint subordinates as he deems necessary. 28 U.S.C. § 594(c) (1982). The independent
counsel may also request the services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in gathering
information. See 28 U.S.C. § 594(d) (1982); S. REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 68.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(6) (1982). As with the Watergate Special Prosecutor, the
independent counsel can challenge in court "any claim of privilege or attempt to withhold
evidence on grounds of national security." Id.
In response to the demands of the Watergate Special Prosecutor that President Nixon
comply with a subpoena duces tecum and release certain tape recordings of White House
conversations, the President invoked the doctrine of executive privilege. The Supreme Court
ordered the production of the tapes and held that the need for information in a criminal
prosecution had to prevail over the President's general interest in confidentiality. United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712-13 (1974).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(1) (1982).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)-(a)(2) (1982).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a)(3) (1982). The independent counsel can also dismiss a matter
within his jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 594(g) (1982).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1982). The power of the independent counsel to decide not to
follow Department of Justice policies underscores his autonomy from the executive branch.
Although the Ethics Act establishes a presumption that the independent counsel will follow
Department of Justice policies except in extreme cases, an independent counsel's failure to
adhere to such policies should not be construed as grounds for removal by the Attorney
General. S. REP. No. 496, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3537, 3552-53.
The independent counsel is subject to general reporting requirements and congressional
oversight. 28 U.S.C. § 595 (1982). This includes periodically apprising Congress of his
activities 28 U.S.C. § 595(a) (1982). An independent counsel must also submit a report to the
special division detailing the final disposition of a matter. 28 U.S.C. § 595(b)(l)-(b)(2) (1982).
Such a report allows the special division to evaluate the independent counsel's decisions. S.
REP. No. 170, supra note 15, at 70-71. Presumably, further action could be taken regarding
the subject of the investigation if the special division finds that the independent counsel's
performance was deficient in some way. See id.
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 596 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).




removal power, however, is subject to judicial review by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 The district
court may, if it finds that the Attorney General has removed an
independent counsel without good cause, reinstate the independent
counsel or grant other appropriate relief.53 Moreover, the special
division itself may remove an independent counsel "at any time, on
the ground that the investigation ... [has] been completed or so sub-
stantially completed" that the Department of Justice may complete
the investigation or prosecution. 4 In either case, the ultimate
removal power over the independent counsel lies with the judicial
branch.
III. APPOINTMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
The Ethics Act authorizes a special division of the D.C. Circuit
to appoint an independent counsel upon the request of the Attorney
General.55 This legislative delegation of appointment power to an
article III court raises two distinct constitutional issues arising from
the language of the appointments clause of the Constitution. The
appointments clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 56
The appointments clause thus establishes two methods of appointing
officers of the United States. The first method provides that certain
officers, who may be referred to as "principal officers," must be
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The second method of appointment provides that Congress may, if it
chooses, vest the appointment of "inferior officers" in the President
52. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, § 2, 101 Stat.
1293, 1305.
53. Id. This review power serves to discourage the President or the Attorney General
from unjustifiably firing an independent counsel.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1982). The special division is only to exercise its removal power
if an independent counsel attempts to stay in office after his investigation is completed. S. REP.
No. 170, supra note 15, at 75 ("[Section 596(b)(2)] provides for the unlikely situation where a
special prosecutor may try to remain as special prosecutor after his responsibilities ... are
completed.").
55. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982).
56. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. Those challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Ethics Act have argued that the
independent counsel is not an inferior officer within the meaning of
the appointments clause, and therefore that he must be nominated by
the President and confirmed by the Senate.57 Further, opponents of
the Act claim that, even if the independent counsel is an inferior
officer, the Constitution does not allow Congress to vest the inter-
branch appointment of executive officers in the judiciary. 8
A. The Definition of "Inferior Officer" Under
the Appointments Clause
The appointments clause of the Constitution applies only to
"officers of the United States." Accordingly, an analysis of the consti-
tutional challenges to the independent counsel legislation requires an
initial determination as to whether the independent counsel is an
officer of the United States. In Buckley v. Valeo,59 the Supreme Court
held that "any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to
the laws of the United States is an 'Officer of the United States' "60
and must be appointed in accordance with the appointments clause.6'
Under this reasoning, because the independent counsel possesses "sig-
nificant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,"62 he is
an officer of the United States, and therefore must be appointed pur-
suant to the appointments clause.63
The appointments clause authorizes appointments in only two
ways: Either the President nominates an officer with the advice and
consent of the Senate, or Congress vests the appointment of an officer,
specifically an "inferior officer," in the President, the courts, or the
head of a department.64 It is thus necessary to determine whether the
independent counsel is an inferior or principal officer under the
appointments clause.
57. North's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 11, at 34-38;
Deaver's Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 11, at 15-16.
58. North's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 11, at 43-51;
Deaver's Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 11, at 16-20.
59. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
60. Id. at 126.
61. Id.; see also United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878) (all officers of the
United States are to be appointed according to one of the two methods specified in the
appointments clause).
62. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. The broad powers of the independent counsel are delineated
at 28 U.S.C. § 594 (1982).
63. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
64. Id. at 125-27.
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1. In re Sealed Case
In striking down the independent counsel legislation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in In re
Sealed Case65 held that the independent counsel is not an inferior
officer within the meaning of the appointments clause, 66 but a princi-
pal officer, who may be appointed only by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.67 In reaching this conclusion, the
majority read the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ger-
maine6' as standing for the proposition that the appointments clause
is to be given a "functional interpretation"; 69 thus, whether an officer
is an inferior officer depends on the powers of the office in question
and whether such powers render the officer inferior, or subordinate, to
a principal officer.7" The majority in In re Sealed Case concluded,
based on its reading of Germaine, that the "independent counsel's
authority is so broad"'" that appointment must be by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The majority's conclusion in In re Sealed Case, however, is ques-
tionable because the Germaine Court never defined the term "inferior
officer." Germaine involved the indictment of a civil surgeon for
extortion under the provisions of a federal statute that explicitly
applied only to "officer[s] of the United States."72 The surgeon
moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that he was not an
officer of the United States, but only an employee.73 The Court
agreed that the surgeon was not an officer because he had not been
65. 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (2-1 decision), rev'g, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987)
(mem.), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988).
66. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 486. The court went on to address other constitutional
issues pertaining to the independent counsel statute. The court's discussion of these other
issues, however, is arguably dicta as evidenced by the language of the court:
The Act's failure to comply with the appointments clause is sufficient to render it
unconstitutional. We decide appellants' other constitutional claims, however, so
that if this decision is appealed, and the Supreme Court decides that these
additional claims must be reached, it will not have to 'either proceed without the
usual benefit of a lower-court opinion or else delay final disposition by remanding
for that purpose.'
Id. at 487 (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom.
Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986)) (The statute at issue in Bowsher, the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, specifically provided for direct Supreme
Court review of the lower court decision.).
67. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 486.
68. 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
69. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 484.
70. See id. at 484-87.
71. Id. at 486.
72. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509.
73. Id.
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appointed in accordance with either of the two methods provided for
in the appointments clause.74 Thus, although the Court in Germaine
addressed the preliminary question of whether a civil surgeon
appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions was an officer of the
United States, subject to the appointments clause,75 the Court at no
time inquired as to what type of officer a civil surgeon might be: prin-
cipal or inferior.7 6
Notwithstanding the majority's reliance on Germaine, the D.C.
Circuit's decision provides an administratively unworkable definition
of inferior officer. In finding that the independent counsel's authority
was "so broad" as to require appointment by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate,77 the court created a standard that
offers little guidance as to which officers are principal and which are
inferior. Because this standard does not specify precisely how broad
an officer's power must be to require appointment by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, disagreements will inevita-
bly arise as to whether an officer's power is broad enough, under this
standard, to make him a principal officer. Thus, the courts will fre-
quently be called upon to make ad hoc determinations as to the scope
of a particular officer's power.
2. THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
Although there is a scarcity of legislative history addressing the
question of which officers were regarded as inferior officers, an exami-
nation of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution suggests that
the appointments clause resulted from a compromise between those
Framers who wanted Congress to possess the appointment power,
and those advocating that the President be vested with such power.78
The product of this compromise is a system in which the appointment
power is divided between the President and Congress. The President,
for example, may nominate certain officers subject to the advice and
consent of the Senate, but Congress may vest the appointment of
other officers in the President alone, the courts, or the heads of
departments. 79 To discern which appointment method is appropriate
74. Id. at 509-11.
75. Id. at 509.
76. Specifically, the Court held that the Commissioner of Pensions, who appointed the
surgeon, was not the head of a department within the meaning of the appointments clause. Id.
at 509-11. In addition, the surgeon was not an officer because his duties were only "occasional
and intermittent." Id. at 512.
77. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
78. See Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment Clause, 37
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1061-70 (1987).
79. The provision for appointment of inferior officers appears to have been made for
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for particular officers, an examination of the language and interpreta-
tion of the appointments clause is essential.
3. A PLAIN READING OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The language of the appointments clause provides for the
appointment of officers falling generally into two categories. First, the
appointments clause specifies that the President must appoint certain
officers with the advice and consent of the Senate. These "principal
officers" are expressly named in the clause: "Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, [and] Judges of the supreme Court. '80
The judges of the "courts of law" as well as the "heads of depart-
ments" should probably be treated as included among this group.
Because Congress may vest in the heads of departments and in the
courts of law the power to appoint inferior officers under the clause,
by implication, these individuals cannot themselves be inferior
officers. 81
Second, the appointments clause provides for the appointment of
another group of officers, deemed "inferior officers." From a plain
reading of the appointments clause, any officer not included in the
first category of officers (any officer who is not a principal officer) is an
inferior officer. After expressly naming those principal officers who
must be nominated by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the clause states that appointment by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate also applies to "all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments. ' 82 The use of the word "such," if given
its ordinary construction, refers back to the phrase that provides for
the appointment of "all other Officers ... whose Appointments are
reasons of administrative convenience. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510; see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627-28 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937).
In order to ensure that appointments would be made only to bona fide offices and not
simply to reward political allies with government posts, the Framers provided that any
appointment must first be authorized by an act of Congress. Thus, the appointments clause
provides that all appointments must be authorized "by Law." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 405-06.
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
81. See also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1530, at 386 n. I (Boston 1833) (suggesting that heads of departments are not inferior
officers).
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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not herein otherwise provided for." 3  Certainly, "such inferior
Officers" would not be referring back to the principal officers whose
appointments require Senate confirmation and who were thought
important enough to be listed by name.
Thus, "all other Officers . . . whose Appointments are not...
provided for" in the appointments clause should be deemed inferior
officers. Stated another Way, an inferior officer is any officer who is
not an ambassador, public minister or consul, a federal judge, or the
head of a department. Therefore, because the independent counsel
does not fall into any of these categories, he should be considered an
inferior officer.84
83. Additionally, the presence of a colon before the words "but the Congress" in the
appointments clause supports the conclusion that "such inferior Officers" refers to all officers
not specifically mentioned in the appointments clause. Because a colon is used, the words that
come after the colon (including "such inferior Officers") are intended to amplify or modify the
words that appear before the colon ("all other Officers)."
84. The Ethics Act limits the ability of the President to remove the independent counsel.
28 U.S.C. § 596 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Attorney General may remove the independent
counsel only if certain stipulated criteria are met. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982). Even then,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia can overrule the Attorney
General and reinstate the independent counsel if the district court finds that the termination
was improper. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, § 2,
101 Stat. 1293, 1305.
Congress has the right to delegate the appointment of an inferior officer. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 2, cl. 2. It, therefore, has the correlative right to impose restrictions on that officer's
removal. United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S.. 483, 485 (1886). In Perkins, the Secretary of the
Navy had dismissed a cadet-engineer. Id. at 483. Congress had explicitly "'vested the
appointment of cadet-engineers in the Secretary of the Navy'" and had enacted a law
restricting their removal. Id. at 484 (quoting, with approval, language of lower court opinion
in Perkins v. United States, 20 Ct. Cl. 438, 444 (1885)). The Court held that the removal was
invalid because the Secretary had no power to remove this inferior officer at will when
Congress had passed a statute limiting removal. Id. at 484-85. The Court stated:
'We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior
officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict the power of
removal as it deems best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in
Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the
officers so appointed.'
Id. at 485 (quoting, with approval, language of lower court opinion in Perkins v. United States,
20 Ct. Cl. 438, 444 (1885)). The Court noted that this ruling related only to inferior officers
and not to those officers nominated by the President, and confirmed by the Senate. Id. at 484;
accord Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161-62 (1926). The Myers Court cited Perkins:
"The Court ... has recognized in the Perkins case that Congress, in committing the appoint-
ment of such inferior officers to the heads of departments, may prescribe incidental regulations
controlling and restricting the latter in the exercise of the power of removal." Id. at 161. For
a discussion of the Myers decision, see E. CORWIN, The President's Removal Power Under the
Constitution, in I CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 317 (R. Loss ed. 1981).
The difference between imposing restrictions on the removal of officers appointed by the
heads of departments, as opposed to officers appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, appears to render inapposite those cases dealing with the latter type of officer. See, e.g.,
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 349-50 (1958) (member of War Claims Commission
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As to inferior officers, Congress has the discretion to vest their
appointment either in the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate, or in the President alone, the courts, or the head of a depart-
ment. The appointments clause specifically gives Congress this
authority by providing that it "may" vest the appointment of inferior
officers in the President, the courts, or the head of a department.
85
4. RELEVANT DECISIONS
The conclusion that the independent counsel is an inferior officer
is supported by what is ostensibly the only case to squarely address
the issue.86 In Collins v. United States,87 the Court of Claims held
that inferior officers are those officers who are inferior to the entity
that appoints them.88 As to the appointment of inferior officers, the
court held that Congress has the discretion to either provide that they
be appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation, or to
vest their appointment in the President alone, in the courts, or in the
heads of departments.89 In Collins, the court stated:
In our opinion, the words [of the appointments clause] as used in
connection with the other language of the same clause, have a
plain, definite, and intelligible meaning, capable of unmistakable
application to effect the purposes of that provision of the Constitu-
tion. Having specified certain officers, ministers, consuls, and
judges of the Supreme Court who shall be nominated by the Presi-
dent and appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate in all cases, the Constitution leaves it to Congress to vest in the
President alone, the courts of law, or the heads of departments the
appointment of any officer inferior or subordinate to them respec-
nominated by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 618 (1935) (member of the Federal Trade Commission nominated
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate); Shurtleff v. United States, 189
U.S. 311, 312-13 (1903) (general appraiser of merchandise nominated by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate). Thus, Congress has plenary authority to impose restrictions
on the removal of the independent counsel, an inferior officer.
85. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. If Congress remains silent as to the method of
appointment of an inferior officer, the language of the clause provides that the inferior officer is
to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id.
86. Collins v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 568 (1879).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 574-75.
89. Id. at 575. Collins involved the reinstatement of Joseph Collins, an Army major,
whom the President had originally appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. at
569. After having been "ungenerously mustered out of service" by the Army, Congress
authorized the President to reinstate Collins and retire him with the pay accorded to a retired
officer of his rank. Id. at 570. The appropriate Treasury officer refused to pay Collins because
the President had unilaterally reappointed Collins, and not with the advice and consent of the
Senate as in the original appointment. Id. The court upheld Collins' reappointment. Id. at
576.
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tively, whenever Congress thinks proper so to do.90
Independent counsels qualify as inferior officers under this approach
because independent counsels are inferior to the entity that appoints
them. The appointing authority is a combination of the Attorney
General and a special division of the D.C. Circuit.91 Together, the
Attorney General and the special division can remove the independ-
ent counsel and define the parameters of his jurisdiction.92 Because
the independent counsel is subordinate to the collective power of this
joint appointment authority, he would be an inferior officer under the
Collins definition.
5. UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
The interpretation of the appointments clause by Attorneys Gen-
eral of the United States since 1853 also supports the conclusion that
the independent counsel is an inferior officer. 93 In response to ques-
tions as to how a particular officer should be appointed, Attorneys
General have issued opinions addressing the subject of inferior
officers. Some opinions have relied on the Collins definition of inferior
officer: An inferior officer is any officer who is subordinate, or "infer-
ior," to some higher authority.94 As discussed above, the independent
counsel would be an inferior officer under such a definition.
The overwhelming majority of Attorney General opinions
addressing the subject of inferior officers, however, have taken a dif-
ferent approach. Generally, in determining how an officer should be
appointed, Attorneys General have simply looked to the statute creat-
90. Id. at 574.
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 592, 593 (1982).
92. 28 U.S.C. §§ 593, 596 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
93. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion for the Assistant Attorney General, Officer for
Improvements in the Administration of Justice, 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 58 (1978);
Appointment of the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization, 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 566
(1937); Authority of Civil Service Commission to Appoint a Chief Examiner, 37 Op. Att'y
Gen. 227 (1933); Promotion of Army Officers, 30 Op. Att'y Gen. 177 (1913); Appointments in
the Department of Commerce and Labor, 29 Op. Att'y Gen. 116 (1911); Paymasters' Clerks in
the Army - Retirement, 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 493 (1909); Delivery of an Insignia from the
German Emperor to a Clerk in the Post-Office Department, 27 Op. Att'y Gen. 219 (1909);
Second Deputy Comptroller of the Currency - Appointment, 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 627 (1908);
Appointment - Student Interpreters at Legation to China, 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 52 (1902);
President - Appointment of Officers - Holiday Recess, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 599 (1901); Army
Officers - Appointment - Original Vacancy, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 574 (1901); Statutory
Construction - Chinese Secretary, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 136 (1900); Department Clerks -
Departmental Practice, 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 363 (1896); Civil Service Commission - Chief
Examiner, 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 409 (1886); Appointments in the Treasury Department, 15 Op.
Att'y Gen. 3 (1875); Appointment of Assistant Secretary of State, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 1 (1853).
94. See, e.g., Memorandum Opinion for the Assistant Attorney General, Officer for
Improvements in the Administration of Justice, 2 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 58 (1978).
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ing the office in question.95 In instances in which Congress has not
specifically vested the appointment of an officer in the President alone,
in a court of law, or in the head of a department, these opinions have
concluded that the officer must be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.96 In instances in which Congress,
however, has vested the appointment of an officer in the President
alone, in a court of law, or in the head of a department, Attorneys
General have normally deferred to Congress' judgment regarding the
method of appointment. Thus, when Congress has chosen to vest the
appointment of an officer other than ambassadors, consuls, or Justices
of the Supreme Court in the President alone, in a court of law, or in
the head of a department, these opinions have not questioned whether
the officer is principal or inferior; they have simply deferred to Con-
gress' choice of appointment method. The only plausible explanation
for this consistent exercise of deference to Congress' choice of
appointment method is that Attorneys General have construed the
appointments clause to mean that all officers other than ambassadors,
consuls, and Justices of the Supreme Court are inferior officers and
that Congress has discretion to provide for how such officers are to be
appointed.
An opinion by Caleb Cushing, Attorney General of the United
States in 1853, illustrates the view of Attorneys General that all
officers not expressly mentioned in the appointments clause are infer-
ior officers. 97 Secretary of State William Marcy had asked the Attor-
ney General for an opinion as to how to appoint the Assistant
Secretary of State, whose appointment had been provided for by an
act of Congress.9" The Attorney General responded that, in instances
in which Congress does not specifically provide for the method of
appointment, the President has the responsibility of appointing the
officer with the advice and consent of the Senate.99 Because "there
[had been] no such express exceptional enactment in the present
case,"' 1 the Attorney General recommended that the President
appoint the Assistant Secretary of State with the advice and consent
of the Senate.' 01 The Attorney General, however, distinguished the
case of the Assistant Secretary of State from other cases, such as the
case of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, whose appointment
95. See, e.g., infra notes 97-103 and accompanying teit.
96. See id.
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Congress had explicitly vested in the head of a department." °2 Thus,
the Attorney General inferred that, in a case such as that of the Assis-
tant Secretary of the Treasury, Congress' choice to vest the appoint-
ment power in the head of a department would be respected.'0 3
B. Interbranch Appointment of Inferior Officers
Opponents of the independent counsel statute have argued that
even if the independent counsel is an inferior officer, Congress cannot
delegate the power to appoint an executive officer to another branch
of government; namely, the judiciary."°4 Such an argument is based
upon the premise that the power to appoint an executive officer can be
vested only in the executive branch. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in Ex parte Siebold,105 however, refused to adhere to
such a narrow view of Congress' appointment power. 10 6 Siebold is
directly relevant to the case of the independent counsel because the
Supreme Court held in Siebold that Congress could vest the appoint-
ment of executive officers in a court of law.' Siebold involved a chal-
lenge to a statute' that authorized a court to appoint election
supervisors to prevent tampering with election results.0 9 The Court
discussed, in general terms, Congress' power under the appointments
clause:
It is no doubt usual and proper to vest the appointment of inferior
officers in that department of the government, executive or judicial,
or in that particular executive department to which the duties of
such officers appertain. But there is no absolute requirement to
this effect in the Constitution ....
. . . [A]s the Constitution stands, the selection of the
appointing power, as between the functionaries named, is a matter
resting in the discretion of Congress." 0
102. Id. at 1-2.
103. Id.
104. North's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 11, at 43-51;
Deaver's Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction, supra note 11, at 16-20.
105. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
106. Id. at 397-98.
107. Id. For other decisions upholding federal court appointment of officers not strictly
within the judicial branch, see Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901) (court appointment of
commissioners of extradition); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (court
appointment of members of District of Columbia Board of Education); United States v.
Solomon, 216 F. Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (court appointment of temporary United States
Attorneys).
108. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, § 2, 16 Stat. 433, 433-34, repealed by Act of Feb. 8, 1894,
ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36, 36-37.
109. See Siebold, 100 U.S. at 373-82.
110. Id. at 397-98. The Court in Siebold narrowed the holding of the earlier case of Ex
parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). In Hennen, the Supreme Court had enunciated a
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The Siebold Court stated that, as long as there is no "incongruity""'
in the power vested in a court by Congress, the delegation of such
power will be upheld." I2 The Siebold majority held that the appoint-
ment of executive officers by a court was not incongruous, "[b]ut... a
constitutional duty of the courts"' ' 3 when the law so requires.14
The Siebold Court's interpretation of the scope of Congress'
appointment power is consistent with the plain language of the
appointments clause. The appointments clause states that "Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.""' 5 The language of the clause suggests that
Congress has flexibility to decide in whom to vest the appointment of
an inferior officer. The Siebold Court's interpretation of the appoint-
ments clause provides that Congress' choice in selecting the
appointing entity should be guided by considerations of "propri-
ety,''116 "convenience,"'' 7 and generally, by a determination as to
which appointing entity will be most "competent to the task.""'
Under such criteria, the appointment of independent counsels by a
court of law is justified because vesting the appointment in the Presi-
dent alone or in the head of a department would defeat the statute's
goal of insulating independent counsels from executive influence.
The Siebold interpretation of the appointments clause parallels
the views of various commentators on the Constitution. Justice Story,
writing in 1833, stated that Congress has latitude to decide in whom
to vest the power to appoint inferior officers." 9 Congress needs this
discretion because "[i]t is difficult to foresee, or to provide for all the
combinations of circumstances, which might vary the right to appoint
.... In one age the appointment might be most proper in the presi-
more restrictive view of Congress' appointment power and stated that, as delegated by
Congress under the appointments clause, the appointment power "was no doubt intended to be
exercised by the department of the government to which the officer to be appointed most
appropriately belonged." Id. at 258. The Siebold Court asserted that the language in Hennen
"was not intended to define the constitutional power of Congress in this regard, but rather to
express the law or rule by which it should be governed." Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398.
111. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398.
112. Id. at 397-98. Such an incongruous delegation of power, for example, would be to
entrust a court with nonjudicial powers. See id. at 398.
113. Id. at 398.
114. Id.
115. U.S. CONST. art. It, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
116. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 398.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1529, at 385-86 (Boston 1833).
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dent; and in another age, in a department."' 2° The comments of the
"Federal Farmer," an anonymous author and opponent of the Consti-
tution whose letters are considered to be an important example of the
antifederalist position, 12 1 also accord considerable flexibility to Con-
gress. 122 Writing in 1788, the "Federal Farmer" viewed Congress'
power to vest the appointment of inferior officers as a mechanism to
preserve the balance among the three branches of government.
123
Congress, for example, could increase or decrease the number of
appointments it vests in the President depending on whether the Pres-
ident is too powerful or too weak at a particular time.'2 4 Because all
such appointments must be created by statute, the ability of Congress
to abuse this discretion is checked by the President's veto power.
2 1
Contrary to the fears of the majority in In re Sealed Case,'26 a
Supreme Court decision upholding Congress' power to vest the
appointment of independent counsels in an article III court would not
allow Congress to vest the appointment of any executive officer in a
court. The Siebold "incongruity"' 127 test serves as an effective limita-
tion on Congress' power to vest appointments. It would not, for
example, be "prop[er]"128 or "convenien[t],"' 129 using-the words of the
Siebold Court, for Congress to vest in a court the appointment of
Assistant Secretaries of State. Such a delegation of appointing power
to a court would be found "incongru[ous]"' 130 because the degree of
interaction between Assistant Secretaries of State and other executive
officers is necessarily significant. In order to perform his job effec-
tively, the Secretary of State must have the power to appoint his sub-
ordinates. The appointment of independent counsels by a court,
however, is not incongruous because, unlike Assistant Secretaries of
State and many other executive officers, an independent counsel does
not work closely with other members of the executive branch.
Instead, an independent counsel requires autonomy so that he may
act without bias.
120. Id.
121. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 214-16 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
122. Letter from The Federal Farmer (Jan. 17, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 2.8.173, at 307-08 (H. Storing ed. 1981).
123. See id. at 308.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1988).






IV. THE POWER OF THE SPECIAL DIVISION TO REMOVE
THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL AND DEFINE
PROSECUTORIAL JURISDICTION
The Ethics Act also accords the judiciary significant power over
the removal of independent counsels and the definition of an
independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction. Upon receiving an
application from the Attorney General for appointment of an
independent counsel,"' a special division of the D.C. Circuit defines
the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the independent counsel by deciding
who should and should not be subject to investigation by the
independent counsel.' 32 Additionally, the special division may
remove an independent counsel.' 33 Although the Attorney General
may himself dismiss an independent counsel, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia may review the Attorney
General's decision.' 34 The question thus arises as to whether the judi-
ciary's powers over an independent counsel's removal and
prosecutorial jurisdiction violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
In addressing separation of powers questions, the Supreme Court
of the United States has often adopted a balancing approach.'35 In
such cases, the Court has weighed the need for the particular statute
or governmental action with the degree to which the statute or action
prevents a branch of government from carrying out its constitutional
responsibilities. 136 In Bowsher v. Synar,137 a case involving the consti-
tutionality of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (Balanced Budget Act), 38 however, the Court adopted a
131. 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982).
133. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1982).
134. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, § 2, 101 Stat.
1293, 1305.
135. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258-61
(1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 582-83, 586-87
(1985); Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-46 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706-13 (1974).
136. See, e.g., id.
137. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
138. Pub. L. No. 99-177, §§ 251-257, 273-275, 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
(99 Stat.) 1037, 1063-93, 1098-1101 (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-907, 921-922)
[hereinafter Balanced Budget Act]. Congress enacted this statute, also known as the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, in response to the federal budget deficit. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.
433, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 71-123, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 988,
988-1041. Congress, through the Balanced Budget Act, sought to eliminate the budget deficit
by authorizing automatic spending reductions over a period of years. See id. The Act
authorized the Comptroller General to mandate across-the-board spending reductions
consistent with a five-year deficit reduction plan. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-907 (West Supp. 1987).
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different approach.139 The Bowsher Court declared the Act unconsti-
tutional, holding that the influence of Congress over the decisions of
the Comptroller General, an officer exercising executive duties, was a
per se violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 4' In rejecting
the balancing test, the Court did not weigh other factors, nor did it
examine whether, in fact, the Act prevented the executive branch
from carrying out its constitutional duties. This Section considers the
application of both the Supreme Court's balancing and per se tests to
the independent counsel dispute.
A. The Per Se Approach: Bowsher v. Synar
The removal provisions of the Ethics Act are very similar to
those contained in the Balanced Budget Act. In Bowsher, the Court
found that the Act violated the separation of powers doctrine by vest-
ing in Congress the power to execute the laws of the United States.' 4 '
The Court reasoned that because Congress had the sole authority to
remove the Comptroller General, an officer exercising executive
duties, Congress had significant influence over his decisions.' 42 Thus,
the Act gave Congress the power to indirectly execute the laws.' 4 3
The independent counsel is analogous to the Comptroller General in
that both exercise executive functions.'" Similar to the way in which
the Comptroller General is removable by Congress,' 45 the authority
to remove the independent counsel lies with the judiciary.146 The
independent counsel law could be found unconstitutional, as was the
Balanced Budget Act, because it authorizes another branch of govern-
ment to remove, and thus influence, an officer who performs executive
duties.
The Bowsher decision rested on two major premises. First, the
Court found that the Comptroller General exercised executive func-
tions. "'47 By having final authority to decide which programs to cut,
These cuts would go into effect if Congress failed to reduce the deficit each year as prescribed
by the Act. Id.
139. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of separation of powers challenges,
see Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987).
140. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 3189-92.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 3191..92; see infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
145. See 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(1)(B) (1982).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 596 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying
text.
147. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191-92. For a critique of the majority's classification of the
Comptroller General's functions as "executive," see Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3199-202 (Stevens,
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the Comptroller General was executing the law. 48 Second, the Court
reasoned that the Comptroller General was subject to the control of
the legislature. 4 9 Due to the fact that he could be removed only by
Congress, the potentially coercive influence of his superiors affected
his decisions. 15 0
Similarly, the Ethics Act appears to contradict the holding of
Bowsher v. Synar because the independent counsel law contains the
two characteristics found in Bowsher. First, like the Comptroller
General, the independent counsel performs executive functions. The
Act provides for the independent counsel to be vested with the power
of the Attorney General in prosecuting executive officials who are sus-
pected of violating the law.15' The responsibility to enforce the laws
and prosecute offenders is an executive function. 52  Second, the
independent counsel, like the Comptroller General in Bowsher, is sub-
ject to interbranch removal; the ultimate authority over his removal
lies not with the executive but with the judicial branch. A special
division of the D.C. Circuit can remove the independent counsel at
any time if, as in Bowsher, certain criteria are met.5 3 Moreover,
J., concurring); Levinson, Balancing Acts: Bowsher v. Synar, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, and
Beyond, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 530-35 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Leading
Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 220, 225-28 (1986).
148. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3191-92.
149. Id. at 3189-91.
150. Id. Under the Balanced Budget Act, although the Comptroller General could be
removed at any time by a joint resolution of Congress, the President could veto such a
* resolution. Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3189 n.7. The Court in Bowsher held the President's veto
power to be inconsequential: "Although the President could veto such a joint resolution, the
veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Congress. Thus, the
Comptroller General could be removed in the face of Presidential opposition . . . . [W]e
therefore read the removal provision as authorizing removal by Congress alone." Id. (citation
omitted). Contra Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3212 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he... [potential for a
Presidential veto] reduces to utter insignificance the possibility that the threat of removal [by
joint resolution of Congress] will induce subservience to the Congress.").
151. 28 U.S.C. § 594 (1982).
152. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
1002 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n. 11 (1982);
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114,
124 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
138 (1976) (per curiam); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Confiscation Cases,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457, 458-59 (1868); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1982). With respect to the power of the special division to
remove an independent counsel, the Act provides:
The division of the court, either on its own motion or upon suggestion of the
Attorney General, may terminate an office of independent counsel at any time,
on the ground that the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial
jurisdiction of the independent counsel ... and any resulting prosecutions, have
been completed or so substantially completed that it would be appropriate for the
Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions.
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although the Attorney General can remove the independent counsel
for certain reasons,154 if the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia finds that the termination was improper, the court
may reinstate the independent counsel.' 55
According to the Court's rationale in Bowsher, the judiciary's
removal power over the independent counsel is tantamount to judicial
control over an officer exercising executive functions. Because the
independent counsel is subject to the pressure of his superiors, the
views of the judicial branch may color his decisions. Thus, under
Bowsher, the power vested in the judiciary to remove the independent
counsel could be held to violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. 15 6
The Bowsher Court found the Balanced Budget Act to be a per
se violation of the separation of powers doctrine because the Act
resulted in an invasion of the powers of the executive branch. In
eschewing a more flexible approach, the Court did not examine the
extent of this invasion to determine whether the constitutional power
of the executive branch was actually being affected in any significant
way. The Court found the Balanced Budget Act unconstitutional
simply by labeling the Comptroller General's functions as "execu-
tive"' 57 and concluding that he was subject to the control of the legis-
lative branch.'5 8
Id.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982). The Attorney General may remove the independent
counsel "only for good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition
that substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel's duties." Id.
155. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, § 2, 101 Stat.
1293, 1305.
156. Some may argue that Bowsher is inapplicable to the independent counsel legislation
because a court of law is not as politically manipulable as is the Congress. This distinction
would appear to be irrelevant. The Bowsher opinion seems to give little weight to the political
character of Congress. Instead, the focus is simply on the influence that one branch of
government can have over an official through the power of removal. See, e.g., Bowsher 106 S.
Ct. at 3188 ("As the District Court observed, 'Once an officer is appointed, it is only the
authority that can remove him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear
and, in the performance of his functions, obey.' ") (quoting, with approval, language of lower
court opinion in Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986)). Thus, the
Bowsher holding suggests that, once the determination is made that the independent counsel is
an executive officer, the power to remove the independent counsel would be unconstitutional
were it lodged anywhere except in the executive branch, because neither the judiciary nor
Congress may exercise executive power.
157. See Bowsher, 106 S. Ct. at 3192.
158. See id. at 3189-91.
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B. The Balancing Approach: Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor
A constitutional analysis of the judiciary's power under the Eth-
ics Act changes significantly upon the application of a balancing
approach. Although a court of law is permitted to exercise "execu-
tive" functions under the Ethics Act, this does not, in and of itself,
render the Act presumptively unconstitutional under a balancing
approach to the separation of powers doctrine.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, 59 a case decided on the same day as Bowsher, is
an example of the application of a balancing approach to separation of
powers questions. The Schor Court addressed the question of
whether an administrative agency, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), had the power to hear common law counter-
claims.' 6 ° In Schor, an investor had an account with a commodity
futures broker.' 6' The account had a negative balance because the
investor's losses and expenses exceeded the money deposited in the
account. 16 2 Alleging that the negative balance was due to the broker's
violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), the investor filed
suit before the CFTC, which is empowered under the CEA to adjudi-
cate investors' reparations claims that a broker violated CEA or
CFTC regulations.' 63 The broker then sought to file a counterclaim,
in the same CFTC action, to recover the negative balance in the inves-
tor's account. 1
64
In upholding the CFTC's jurisdiction over such counterclaims,
the Court approached the separation of powers question in a manner
completely distinct from the Court's approach in Bowsher. The lan-
guage of Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Schor, illus-
trates this contrast:
[B]right line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad
principles applicable in all Article III inquiries. Rather, due
regard must be given in each case to the unique aspects of the con-
gressional plan at issue and its practical consequences in light of
the larger concerns that underlie Article III. 165
The Schor majority held that the CFTC's jurisdiction to hear com-
mon law counterclaims was not a violation of the separation of pow-
159. 106 S. Ct. 3245 (1986).
160. Id. at 3249.
161. Id. at 3250.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3251.
165. Id. at 3261 (citation omitted).
1988]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ers doctrine. 166  In particular, the Court found the CFTC's
encroachment upon the power of the judicial branch to be slight and
the need for CFTC counterclaim jurisdiction to be significant. 67 Ini-
tially, the Court stated that the CFTC's article III power does not
differ significantly from the adjudicatory powers of most agencies.1 6 1
The only difference, the Court said, is the CFTC's jurisdiction over
common law counterclaims. 69 Moreover, the CFTC's counterclaim
jurisdiction and other powers are confined to a narrow field of law
and are enforceable only by a United States district court.' 71 Parties
are not forced to bring their claims before the CFTC, but have the
option to sue in federal court instead.' 7' Further, the Court stated
that to deny counterclaim jurisdiction, to the CFTC would undermine
the congressional purpose behind the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 1
Without CFTC counterclaim jurisdiction, for example, a broker
would have to bring a separate action in court to recover the deficit in
an investor's account, despite the fact that an action brought by the
investor may already be pending before the CFTC. 173 Such a result
would impede the objective of achieving quick and inexpensive resolu-
tion of such disputes. 174
Thus, although the CFTC, an administrative agency, exercises
"judicial" power, such a finding was held not to be a per se constitu-
tional violation. In analyzing whether the CFTC's counterclaim
jurisdiction violated separation of powers principles, the Court
examined several factors, none of which was independently disposi-
tive. Unlike the Bowsher majority's rigid, presumptive finding of
unconstitutionality, the majority in Schor took a flexible approach,
examining "the degree of judicial control saved to the federal courts,
[the] .. .congressional purpose behind the jurisdictional delegation,
the demonstrated need for the delegation, and the limited nature of
the delegation." 71
If applied to the independent counsel dispute, Schor's balancing
approach leads to a finding that the removal and jurisdiction powers
delegated to the judicial branch do not violate the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. For, as in Schor, the executive power delegated to the
166. Id. at 3259-60.
167. Id. at 3258-61.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 3258-59.
171. Id. at 3260.
172. Id. at 3260-61.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Id. at 3260 (citation omitted).
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special division under the Ethics Act is strictly limited, while the need
for the independent counsel legislation is compelling.
Under the Ethics Act, the judicial branch may exercise its power
only if the Attorney General, a member of the executive branch, first
determines that there are sufficient grounds for the appointment of an
independent counsel.' 7 6 Moreover, an independent counsel may only
investigate those officials specified under the Ethics Act 77 who have
been accused of committing a criminal offense other than certain
classes of misdemeanors. 78 Thus, the judiciary is authorized to act
only when the Attorney General authorizes an appointment, the
Department of Justice is presented with a conflict of interest, and one
of the limited number of officials specified under the Act is suspected
of having committed a criminal offense.
Second, the independent counsel legislation is vital to overcome
the inherent conflict of interest that would affect the judgment of
members of the executive branch. Because the Attorney General is
closely associated with the President, the Vice President and other
high level executive officials in both a professional and a personal
capacity, 79 the members of the Department of Justice cannot be
relied upon to conduct an impartial investigation of executive officers.
Because of this conflict of interest, the power to remove the independ-
ent counsel and define his jurisdiction should not be lodged in the
executive branch.
The policy issues underlying the independent counsel dispute
were considered by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 80
another opinion in which the Court applied a balancing approach to
the separation of powers question. In Nixon, the President refused to
comply with a subpoena duces tecum ordering the President to turn
over various tape recordings of his conversations.' 8' In response to
the subpoena, President Nixon invoked, under the doctrine of execu-
tive privilege, the right to refuse to disclose records of his communica-
tions. "'82 In addition, he argued that the need to preserve the
autonomy of the executive branch justified a President's refusal to
obey a subpoena.' 83 The Supreme Court, however, ordered the pro-
176. 28 U.S.C. § 592 (1982). The Attorney General's decision is not subject to judicial
review. See supra note 34.
177. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a)-(b) (1982). For a list of those individuals subject to the Act, see
supra note 4.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (Supp. III 1985).
179. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
180. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
181. Id. at 687-88.
182. Id. at 688, 703.
183. Id. at 706.
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duction of the tapes,' s4 and held that the need to achieve justice in a
criminal prosecution must prevail over a "generalized interest in con-
fidentiality."'8 5 The Court described the compelling need for the
President to obey the subpoena: "Without access to specific facts a
criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated."1' 86  Further, the
Court stated that the intrusion on the executive branch would be min-
imal: "The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communi-
cations will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pend-
ing criminal cases."'81 7 Similar to the Court's reasoning in Schor, the
Nixon Court found the encroachment on executive power to be lim-
ited and the need for the particular governmental action significant. 188
The balancing of interests arguments that the Court made in
Schor and Nixon can be applied to the independent counsel legisla-
tion. That is, although the limited nature of the judiciary's power
under the Ethics Act does not intrude substantially upon the power of
the executive branch, the need for independent counsels is manifest.
Consequently, under a balancing approach, the independent counsel
legislation appears not to violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
C. Bowsher and Schor: Determining the Proper Test for Resolving
Separation of Powers Questions
To prevent any one branch of the federal government from
acquiring too much power, the Framers of the Constitution created a
tripartite system of government based on both separation and interde-
pendence. Although the Framers recognized the need for autonomy,
the Framers did not intend the branches to be completely separate.'89
184. Id. at 716.




189. In rejecting the idea of total separation between the branches, James Madison quoted
the words of Montesquieu:
[I]t may clearly be inferred that in saying "There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of
magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers," [Montesquieu] did not mean that these departments
ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His
meaning, as his own words import . . . can amount to no more than this, that
where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution are subverted.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302-03 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441-43 & n.5 (1977) (concluding that the Consti-
tution does not require total separation).
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Rather, the Constitution provides for interdependence between the
branches so that the actions of one branch may act as a check on the
powers of another. As examples of such interdependence, the Consti-
tution grants the President "legislative" power by authorizing the
President to either approve or veto acts of Congress. 190 The House of
Representatives exercises "executive" power in prosecuting officers
during an impeachment proceeding.' 91 The Senate exercises "judi-
cial" power through its authority to try those officers accused of
impeachable offenses. 192 Through this framework of interdependence,
the Constitution enables each branch to check the powers of another,
and thus ensures a balance of power among the branches. 193
Consequently, the Court's per se approach in Bowsher v. Synar,
focusing on complete separation, is not the proper test for resolving
separation of powers questions. The Bowsher approach, used to strike
down the Balanced Budget Act upon a showing of any encroachment
on executive branch power, fails to account for the essential roles of
both separation and checks and balances in the structure of the fed-
eral government. Conversely, the balancing approach to the separa-
tion of powers doctrine applied by the Court in Schor and Nixon,
focusing on the extent of one branch's invasion on the power of
another, is consistent with the constitutional balance of autonomy and
interdependence.
Thus, in analyzing whether the independent counsel legislation
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, the question is not
whether the judicial branch may be exercising some executive power,
but whether the Ethics Act accords the judiciary so much executive
power as to upset the Constitution's balance of separation and checks
and balances. Viewed in this context, the power given by the Ethics
Act to the judicial branch does not violate the doctrine of separation
of powers. The judicial branch is not given sweeping executive power
under the Ethics Act so as to emasculate the authority of the execu-
tive branch. Nor does the Act vest so much power in the judiciary as
to create a realistic fear of judicial usurpation of power at the expense
of the other branches.
Rather, the judiciary's role under the Ethics Act is characterized
by congressional grants of authority narrowly tailored to meet specific
needs. The provisions of the Act apply only to those situations in
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
193. For a discussion of the system of checks and balances, see THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J.
Madison).
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which the executive branch is presented with a conflict of interest.
Moreover, no independent counsel is appointed unless the Attorney
General, an executive officer, first determines that there are grounds
to suspect that another executive officer has committed a criminal
offense. Once an independent counsel is appointed, the Act autho-
rizes a special three-member court, which is barred from adjudicating
any matter brought by the independent counsel, 194 to define the prose-
cutor's jurisdiction and to remove him under certain circumstances.
Moreover, the independent counsel legislation is essential to
maintain the system of checks and balances. Without such legislation,
members of the executive branch will be responsible for the prosecu-
tion of other executive officers, a stark conflict of interest. The pres-
ence of this conflict of interest undermines the Framers' objective of
diffusing power among the three branches in order to prevent those in
government from abusing their authority and circumventing the fair
and impartial administration of the laws. Writing in the Federalist
Papers, James Madison alluded to the need for a system of checks and
balances:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on gov-
ernment would be necessary. In framing a government which is to
be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and
in the next place oblige it to control itself.1 95
The independent counsel legislation provides a necessary check on
executive branch power by ensuring the impartial investigation of
executive officers. Thus, it is the elimination of independent counsels,
rather than their continued presence, that poses a significant threat to
the underlying principles of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The central purpose of the Ethics Act is the elimination of execu-
tive branch influence over the investigation and prosecution of execu-
tive officers. To eliminate this fundamental conflict of interest,
Congress created an independent counsel who cannot be appointed,
supervised, or removed at will by any member of the executive
branch. In essence, Congress established an executive office with little
relation to the executive branch.
To ensure that independent counsels remain impervious to exec-
194. 28 U.S.C. § 49(f) (1982); Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-191 § 2, 101 Stat. 1293, 1305.
195. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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utive branch influence, the Act vests the power to appoint independ-
ent counsels in a court of law. The appointment provisions of the Act
are constitutional because independent counsels are inferior officers
and because Congress may, consistent with the Constitution, delegate
to a court the appointment of inferior executive officers. Congress
may not, however, vest the appointment of any executive officer in a
court. The Supreme Court's language in Ex parte Siebold limits Con-
gress' power to vest interbranch appointments to only those cases in
which an executive officer's appointment by a court will not adversely
affect, or may even be essential to, the successful performance of his
statutory duties. 96 The unique responsibility of independent counsels
in the impartial investigation of executive officers presents such a case.
Further, the judiciary's powers of removal and jurisdiction under
the Ethics Act are constitutional because they are consistent with the
Constitution's system of separation and checks and balances. The
judiciary's power over independent counsels poses no realistic threat
to the constitutional integrity of executive branch power. The grants
of authority to the judiciary are strictly limited and are thus not likely
to serve as a springboard for wholesale judicial intervention into exec-
utive branch affairs.
Moreover, the need for a system of checks and balances justifies
the Act's minor invasion on executive branch authority. The investi-
gation of executive officers by other executive officers presents a con-
flict of interest that undermines the impartial application of the laws
of the United States. Such a conflict of interest is inconsistent with
the Framers' goal of providing checks against the propensity for
abuses of power. The independent counsel legislation responds to this
constitutional anomaly by importing traditional notions of checks and
balances into the procedure for investigation of executive officers.
ALEXANDER I. TACHMES
196. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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